STATE OF ILLINOIS ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION

Illinois Commerce Commission) On Its Own Motion)	
Notice of Inquiry into the need for an expedited hearings process for complaints against an alternative gas supplier where the complainant seeks a cease and desist order under Section 19-120 of the Public Utilities Act	04-NOI-01
COMMENTS OF PEOPLES ENERGY SERVICES CORPORATION	
Pursuant to the Illinois Commerce Commission's ("Commission") August	
4, 2001 Notice of Inquiry ("NOI") and 83 III. Admin. Code Part 1700, Peoples	
Energy Services Corporation ("PE Services") hereby responds to the questions	
raised in the NOI.	
The exact legal name of PE Services is Peoples Energy Services	
Corporation. PE Services is a corporation organized and existing under the laws	
of the State of Illinois, with its principal place of business at 130 East Randolph	
Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60601. PE Services is principally engaged in the	
business of providing energy services, including selling natural gas, to retail	
customers in Illinois. It is certified by the Commission as an "alternative retail	
electric supplier" ("ARES"), as that term is defined in Section 16-102 of the Illinois	
Public Utilities Act (the "Act") ¹ , and as an "alternative gas supplier" ("AGS"), as	
that term is defined in Section 19-105 of the Act ² .	

^{1 220} ILCS §5/16-102. 2 220 ILCS §5/19-105.

GENERAL COMMENTS

PE Services shares the Commission's concern that complaint cases against AGS and ARES be handled promptly. From the perspective of a competitive supplier, the uncertainty and delay that litigation often entails are disruptive, costly and unproductive. PE Services notes that Section 10-108 of the Act³ contemplates that complaints will be completed within one year of filing. PE Services would not oppose a process that was designed to ensure that complaints against AGS and ARES were completed more promptly than complaints against public utilities.

Given the flexibility available under the Commission's existing rules to set procedural schedules that accommodate the needs of a particular complaint, it is unclear that a set of rules could be developed that would better serve the interests and protect the rights of parties to complaint cases. PE Services is aware of only three complaints under the Alternative Gas Supplier Law ("AGS Law"), and none under the comparable statutory provisions applicable to ARES. Moreover, certain of the procedures that are cited in the NOI Appendix are barred by the AGS Law's requirement for notice and a hearing before the Commission imposes the remedies permitted by the AGS Law. At this time, it appears premature to adopt special rules. However, if the Commission elects to promulgate such rules, PE Services urges the Commission not to adopt rigid rules that preclude the ALJ from adopting procedural schedules and processes that are tailored to the specific complaint, nor to use Article XIII as a guideline.

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²²⁰ ILCS §5/10-108. 220 ILCS §5/19-100 *et seq.*

1. a. Is there a need for the Commission to implement an expedited process for complaints filed under Section 19-120 of the Public Utilities Act [220 ILCS 5/19-120] in which the complainant seeks a cease and desist order? Please provide specific examples of Section 19-120 docketed proceedings before the Commission in which the lack of an expedited process resulted in denial of the relief sought by the complainant.

PE Services questions the need for special procedures to address the cease and desist provision in the AGS Law, as nothing in the Commission's current rules prevent the Administrative Law Judges ("ALJs") from setting expedited schedules. The complaint case docket before the Commission in which "cease and desist" relief has been requested is very limited. There is no evidence that the lack of an expedited process resulted in the denial of the "cease and desist" relief sought by the complainant, nor is there evidence of customer harm from the absence of special procedures to address such complaints. Indeed, in the only case in which the Commission issued an order, there was no finding of customer harm. Given this limited record and the absence of customer harm, it is premature to adopt special rules.

First, PE Services is aware of three complaints brought under the AGS

Law for which a cease and desist order was requested. In two of these cases, the ALJ set expedited schedules. The absence of special rules for handling these matters was not an obstacle. For example, in Docket 02-0425, a complaint was filed in June 2002, the complaint was amended and a motion for cease and desist was filed in July 2002 and the matter was set for hearing in November 2002. No hearings were held. The complainant ultimately moved to dismiss the

⁵ Docket Nos. 02-0425, 03-0592 and 04-0034.

proceeding, with prejudice. Apparently, the matters at issue were addressed in another proceeding. However, the ALJ and the parties set a schedule that placed the case on a relatively quick path to resolution. In Docket 03-0592, the complaint was filed on September 30, 2003, a status hearing was held October 6, 2003, an amended complaint was filed one month later, a hearing was held on November 21, 2003 and the record reopened for an additional hearing on January 9, 2004. Throughout this process, the respondent was engaged in lengthy discussions with the Commission Staff in an effort to resolve the issues raised in the complaint. Although an order was not issued until July 2004, this delay was not attributable to the schedule on which the evidentiary phase of the case was conducted. Again, the ALJ and the parties set a schedule that placed the case on a relatively quick path to resolution. In the third case, Docket 04-0034, the complaint has been amended, there have been several procedural motions and there appear to be jurisdictional issues that have delayed the litigation of this case. Certainly, if the Commission's jurisdiction is in question, expedited procedures are not appropriate.

Second, in the only case, of which PE Services is aware, that has been fully litigated, Docket 03-0592, the record included no evidence of customer harm.

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⁶ If the Commission wants respondents to work with its Staff to try to narrow or resolve complaints, it must take into account that such efforts can be time-consuming and lead to delay.

80	Third, the Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Law of 1997
81	includes a similar "cease and desist" provision, 8 and PE Services is aware of no
82	complaints brought under that statutory provision.
83	In sum, there is no evidence that the absence of special rules to handle
84	"cease and desist" requests has been detrimental to complainants, nor an
85	impediment to the prompt resolution of complaint cases brought under the AGS
86	Law. The Commission's existing procedural rules give the ALJs ample discretion
87	to prevent undue delay.
88 89 90	1.b. Should an "expedited" cease and desist process include an opportunity for "emergency" relief such as that which is available under Sections 13-514 and 13-515 of the Public Utilities Act when a competitive telecommunications carrier

1.b. Should an "expedited" cease and desist process include an opportunity for "emergency" relief such as that which is available under Sections 13-514 and 13-515 of the Public Utilities Act when a competitive telecommunications carrier alleges that the anticompetitive actions of an incumbent carrier will cause irreparable harm to the complainant? As stated in the response to 1(a), there is no support for adopting special rules to handle cease and desist requests. However, were the Commission to adopt such rules, Sections 13-514 and 13-515 of the Act are not apt analogies.

There are critical distinctions between Article XIII and Article XIX of the Act, and the Commission should not draw on Article XIII in fashioning a process. First, and most importantly, the emergency relief provided for in Section 13-515(e) expressly provides for relief "without an evidentiary hearing." By contrast, Section 19-120(c) of the Act expressly requires notice and hearing. Consequently, the Section 13-515 process cannot, through a rulemaking, be made applicable under the AGS Law.

Second, Sections 13-514 and 13-515 relate to a telecommunications carrier impeding competition. Were there an analogous provision in the AGS

⁷ 220 ILCS §5/16-101 et seq.

⁸ 220 ILCS §5/16-115B(b)(1).

⁹ "An order for emergency relief may be granted, without an evidentiary hearing," 220 ILCS §5/13-515(e).

Law, it would apply to public utilities. Instead, the AGS Law provides for the limited regulation of competitors, *i.e.*, entities seeking to compete in the unbundled market and not entities that can block competitors.

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Finally, permitting emergency relief, without a hearing, would place the respondent at a competitive disadvantage based on allegations to which it had no or a limited opportunity to respond. For a natural gas supplier, timing is critical in ensuring that it can stand behind the price it offers. A cease and desist order based on little more than allegations of misconduct would be costly to a supplier. In particular, a supplier will have expended time and money on developing and marketing a product and may have procured supply that needs to be liquidated. There may also be opportunity costs resulting from such an order. If the supplier ultimately prevails in the case, this would not compensate for the lost costs stemming from the initial order. The Commission should be mindful of the unintended consequences of adopting processes that make it easy for a complainant to disrupt a competitive supplier's business on bare allegations of wrongdoing. 10 The potential for such disruption may discourage competitors from entering the market or cause suppliers to be overly cautious in developing and marketing new products and services.

1.c. Would the availability of an expedited or emergency cease and desist process under Article 19 be intended to prevent harm to competition in a manner similar to that provided in Section 13-515 of the Public Utilities Act? If so, please explain how a complaint *against* a competitive gas supplier is comparable to a complaint that is filed *by* a competitive telecommunications carrier against a

PE Services notes the express language in Section 13-515(i) that is intended to address frivolous complaints. Complainants under this section are certifying that a complaint is not being brought to harass or cause unnecessary delay in the provision of competitive services. 220 ILCS §5/13-515(i). These standards, while not spelled out in the AGS Law, should certainly apply to complaints under that or any other provision of the Act.

noncompetitive carrier.

No. As stated in the response to 1(b), Article XIX governs competitors who have no market power to impede competition. By contrast, Article XIII is directed at entities who may be able to impede competition.

1.d. What other purposes would be served by an expedited or emergency cease and desist process? For what other types of inappropriate activities could emergency cease and desist relief be requested? Is fraudulent marketing one such activity? Are there others? Should simply including the words "cease and desist" in a complaint be sufficient to initiate the emergency relief process and any deadlines associated with it?

For the reasons stated in the responses to 1(a) and (b), an expedited or emergency process is not needed. However, were the Commission to adopt such a process, simply including the words "cease and desist" in the complaint should not be sufficient to trigger an expedited or emergency process. The complainant should be required to plead with specificity why a cease and desist order is appropriate. The respondent must have sufficient notice of the complainant's specific allegations to respond effectively. See the response to 1(e).

1.e. If an expedited or emergency process were implemented, what standards would be applicable for granting emergency relief? Would a showing of irreparable harm and likelihood of success on the merits be required? Should anyone other than the entity being harmed be permitted to seek emergency relief?

The requested relief is comparable to a request for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the standard for granting such relief should be comparable. Under Illinois law, a complaint that requests injunctive relief must show the following four elements:

• That the plaintiffs possess a certain and clearly ascertained "right" which needs protection;

157 That plaintiffs will suffer "irreparable injury" without the protection of the 158 injunction: 159 • That there is no "adequate remedy at law;" and 160 That the plaintiffs are likely to be successful on the merits of his action. 161 Bromberg v. Whitler, 57 III App. 3d 152, 155, 372 N. E. 2d 837 (1978). These 162 standards would be appropriate for governing any emergency or expedited 163 process. Also, consistent with these standards, the entity alleging harm should 164 be the complainant with the burden of making these showings. 165 1.f. Does the Commission have the statutory authority to require the posting of 166 a bond by the person requesting the emergency relief? If the Commission has 167 the authority, what factors would the Commission consider in setting the amount 168 of the bond? 169 PE Services has no opinion on this question. 170 2. In the absence of specific statutory authority mandating expedited 171 proceedings, is there a statutory basis for expedited proceedings under Section 19-120 of the Public Utilities Act? Please provide specific citations to any relevant 172 Sections of the Public Utilities Act and the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act. 173 174 The authority and power of the Commission is guided by the Act. "The 175 Commission, because it is a creature of the legislature, derives its power and 176 authority solely from the statute creating it, and its acts or orders which are beyond the purview of the statute are void." Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Com., 177 178 79 III. 2d 213, 217-218 (1980) (citing People ex rel. Illinois Highway 179 Transportation Co. v. Biggs, 402 III. 401, 409 (1949)). As stated above, Section 180 19-120 of the Act requires notice and a hearing before the Commission takes 181 one of the actions authorized by the AGS Law. However, the ALJs have 182 considerable latitude in managing their dockets, including setting schedules. 183 See, e.g., 83 III. Admin. Code Part 200, Subparts C and D. As a check on that

discretion, a party that disagrees with an ALJ's decision can petition the Commission for interlocutory review. In fact, the ALJs have put expedited schedules in place for two of the complaints brought under the AGS Law.

3. a. Will expedited proceedings afford all parties to a complaint proceeding sufficient due process?

Without a specific proposal upon which to comment, PE Services cannot conclude that an expedited proceeding would protect the parties' due process rights. Moreover, the facts of a particular case may require discovery or raise additional issues that cannot be accommodated by an expedited schedule. However, as stated in the response to 2, the ALJs can establish an expedited schedule, and a party that believes the schedule deprives it of due process can petition the Commission. In other words, the Commission's current procedural rules and processes are sufficient to strike an appropriate balance between expediting proceedings and protecting parties' due process rights.

3.b. If an expedited or emergency process is implemented, what procedural steps would be appropriate to ensure that parties have a reasonable opportunity to participate and that an informed decision, based on evidence of record, can be reached? For example, should a reasonable opportunity for discovery be provided? Are some procedural steps required by statute or rule?

The AGS Law requires notice and a hearing before the Commission can impose any of the remedies provided in Section 19-120, including the issuance of a cease and desist order. The Commission's Rules of Practice are sufficient to cover the various types of hearings that may be appropriate. Whether discovery is necessary to protect due process rights likely depends on the facts of the case. For example, in Docket 03-0592, a case involving PE Services, the Commission Staff conducted discovery, but neither PE Services nor the complainant, the

Citizens Utility Board, conducted any discovery. Similarly, what evidence is needed will depend on the allegations in the complaint. The complexity and number of issues, as well as whether facts are in dispute, affect the type of hearing and the evidentiary record that must be developed. For example, in some complaint cases, evidence in the form of pre-filed written testimony may be the most effective way for the Commission to have a complete record before it, while in other cases, oral testimony or affidavits would be sufficient. 3.c. Would the expedited or emergency cease and desist relief be granted in an interim order? If so, is there a statutory basis for doing so? The AGS Law requires notice and a hearing before the Commission can impose any of the remedies provided in Section 19-120, including the issuance of a cease and desist order. See the response to 1(e). 4. If an expedited proceeding is necessary, identify any current Commission rules that would need to be amended to provide for such a proceeding. Commission rules do not need to be amended, as proceedings can be expedited as necessary under the existing rules. See the responses to 3(a) and 3(b).

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For the foregoing reasons, PE Services respectfully requests that the

228 Commission not adopt special rules to govern complaints under the AGS Law.

Respectfully submitted,

Peoples Energy Services Corporation

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